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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
UNIVERSITY OF UTAH,

Plaintiff,
vs.
BOARD OF EXAMINERS OF THE
STATE OF UTAH, ET AL.,
Defendants & Appellants,

Case No.

8457

STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION,
Intervenor & Respondent.

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

STATEMENT OF FACTS
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Third Judicial
District Court in and for Salt Lake County, the Honorable
Martin M. Larson presiding. This action was brought by
respondent in the form of a petition for intervention in the
case of University of Utah v. Board of Examiners, et al.,
now pending before this Court. The motion to intervene
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was granted. A judgment was entered settling the dispute
between the University and the Board of Education. Thereafter, by stipulation of all parties, approved by the trial
court, the matters between the University of Utah and
Board of Examiners, on the one hand, and the State Board
of Education and the Board of Examiners, on the other
hand, were separately argued and separately determined.
Thus, the two branches of the case are now in fact two
separate cases independent of one another.
By their complaint, the State Board of Education sought
a declaratory judgment as to certain issues which may be
generally classed as follows :
( 1) Whether the Board of Examiners has authority
to examine and approve or disapprove expenditures previously authorized by the State Board of Education and, if
so, whether the exercise of such authority is discretionary
or ministerial.
( 2) Whether the Commission of Finance has authority to examine and approve or disapprove expenditures
previously authorized by the State Board of Education and,
if so, whether the exercise of such authority is discretionary or ministerial.
(3) Whether the Commission of Finance has authority to approve or disapprove appointments of employees
made by the State Board of Education.
(4) Whether the Budget Officer, in conjunction with
the Governor, has authority to approve or disapprove work
programs submitted by the State Board of Education.
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(5) \Vhether the Attorney General has the right to
disapprove the appointment of independent legal counsel
to represent the State Board of Education in cases involving disputes with another department or agency of the
State.
These issues were submitted to the court on the pleadt' ings, stipulation of facts (R. 24-56) and documentary evidence introduced by respondent (R. 78) over the objection
of appellants. No witnesses testified. Briefs were filed and
rn oral argument was had. Thereafter, the trial court rendered its opinion (R. 57-68) and granted judgment to
respondent (R. 72-73).

n

As we understand the opinion and judgment of the
trial court, it was determined :

m

( 1) That the Board of Examiners has no jurisdiction
over expenditures for salaries but does have a limited ministerial authority over all other expenditures of the State
Board of Education.
(2) That the Commission of Finance has only a limited ministerial authority over expenditures of the State
Board of Education.
(3) That the Commission of Finance may disapprove
the appointment of employees of the State Board of Education unless such employees are "experts or specially
qualified personnel."
( 4) That the Budget Officer and the Governor have
no authority to disapprove work programs submitted by
the State Board of Education unless such work programs
exceed appropriated funds.
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( 5) That the State Board of Education may retain
legal counsel, independent of the Attorney General, when
the Attorney General represents another department with
which the Board of Education has a dispute.
As can be seen, the results sought and the judgment
granted relate primarily to supervision of the financial
activities of the State Board of Education by other state
departments and agencies. As the State Board of Education and the agencies it controls is one of the three largest
departments of the State, spending from one fourth to one
third of total State revenues, the result of this case is of
great importance. We suggest, however, that because of
the reasons advanced for the judgment, the judgment, if
sustained, would also have far-reaching effects on the
financial operations of all departments of the State as well
as the State Board of Education. Furthermore, the theory
and conclusion of the trial court that the State Board of
Education is a fourth branch of government with constitutionally vested powers would alter the present relationship
of the State Board of Education to the Legislative and
Judicial as well as the Executive Branches of our State
Government. We ask the Court to keep these broader
aspects in mind when considering this case.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
BY OUR CONSTITUTION, THE BOARD OF
EXAMINERS HAS DISCRETIONARY AUTHORITY TO APPROVE OR DISAPPROVE
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ALLEXPENDITURESOFTHESTATEBOARD
OF EDUCATION.
POINT II
BY STATUTE, THE BOARD OF EXAMINERS
HAS DISCRETIONARY AUTHORITY TO APPROVE OR DISAPPROVE EXPENDITURES
OF THE STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION.
POINT III
THE COMMISSION OF FINANCE, AS AGENT
OF THE BOARD OF EXAMINERS OR BY
STATUTE, HAS POWER TO APPROVE OR
DISAPPROVE EXPENDITURES MADE BY
THE STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION.
POINT IV
THE COMMISSION OF FINANCE IS AUTHORIZED AND REQUIRED BY STATUTE TO APPROVE OR DISAPPROVE ALL APPOINTMENTS OF EMPLOYEES MADE BY THE
STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION, INCLUDING
EXPERTS AND SPECIALLY QUALIFIED PERSONNEL.
POINT V
THE DUTY OF THE BUDGET OFFICER,
UNDER THE DIRECTION OF THE GOVERNOR, TO APPROVE OR DISAPPROVE WORK
PROGRAMS SUBMITTED BY THE STATE
BOARD OF EDUCATION, IS CONSTITUTIONAL.
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POINT VI
THE STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION IS NOT
A FOURTH BRANCH OF STATE GOVERNMENT.
POINT VII
IN DISPUTES BETWEEN STATE DEPARTMENTS, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL HAS
DISCRETION TO REFUSE TO APPOINT
COUNSEL.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
BY OUR CONSTITUTION, THE BOARD OF
EXAMINERS HAS DISCRETIONARY AUTHORITY TO APPROVE OR DISAPPROVE
ALL EXPENDITURES OF THE STATE BOARD
OF EDUCATION.
Article VII, Section 13, Constitution of the State of
Utah provides :
"Until otherwise provided by law, the Governor,
Secretary of State and Attorney General shall constitute a Board of State Prison Commissioners,
which Board shall have such supervision of all matters connected with the State Prison as may be
provided by law. They shall, also, constitute a Board
of Examiners, with power to examine all claims
against the State, except salaries or compensation
of officers fixed by law, and perform such other
duties as may be prescribed by law · and no claim
against the State, except for salarie~ and compen-
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sation of officers fixed by law, shall be passed upon
by the Legislature without having been considered
and acted upon by the said Board of Examiners."
This or similar provisions are contained in the constitutions
of only four states: Utah, Idaho, Nevada and Montana.
In all these states, the Board exercises highly important
functions commensurate with the position of the members
of the Board who, as the highest elected officials of the
respective states, are directly responsible to the people.
It is our contention that under the Utah Constitution,
the Board of Examiners has the right and responsibility
to approve or disapprove expenditures of state funds by
all departments and agencies of the State, including the
State Board of Education. This is not a mere ministerial
function but an authorization to inquire into the !ldvisability
or necessity of a particular expenditure. It is obvious that
the Board also has the authority to deny illegal expenditures
of public funds. There is one exception to the jurisdiction
of the Board-salaries or compensation of officers fixed
by law. As will appear from the cases, this exception is
limited to salaries or compensation fixed in a sum certain
by the Legislature and does not include salaries or compensation fixed by a board, department or agency of the
State other than the Legislature.

The primary check on the power of the Board is by
appeal to the Legislature whose decision is final. A second
check on this power is through the courts who can ( 1)
prevent arbitrary action by the Board, (2) require the
Board to take some action on a claim, to either approve or
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disapprove it, but not control the discretion of the Board
to either approve or disapprove, and (3) require approval
of a claim where the sole reason for its disapproval was a
misinterpretation of the legality of the claim by the Board
(this third situation should be distinguished from disapproval of a claim where the Board regards it an unnecessary
or unwise expenditure of state funds-in that event, a court
can only inquire into the arbitrariness, if any, of the action
taken, the claimant being left with an appeal to the Legislature on the question of the advisability of the expenditure).

A.

The Jurisdiction of the Board of Examiners.
1.

Generally.

A clear statement of the jurisdiction of the Board of
Examiners is found in State ex rel. Davis v. Edwards, 33
Utah 243, 93 Pac. 720. There, a claim was made by a court
stenographer, appointed by a district judge pursuant to
statute, for mileage allowed him by statute for travel in
the course of his official duties. The amount claimed had
been approved and certified as correct by the District Judge,
all in compliance with the applicable statute (Sees. 1 & 2,
Ch. 72, Laws of Utah 1899). The statute in question required the Auditor to draw his "·arrant for the amount
certified by the District Judge with no requirement that
the claim be approved by the Board of Exa1uiners. Natwithstanding, the Court held that the claim must first be
submitted to the Board by virtue of Article VII, Section 13
-a mandatory provision which could not be avoided by
the claimant, the Legislature, or a court.
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The Court stated (33 Utah at 250) :
"The attempt by the Legislature to require the
Auditor to allow a claim which by the Constitution
must first be approved by the Board of Examiners
can avail nothing. The Auditor is bound by the
constitutional provision. The Legislature is so
bound, and so are we. The Legislature may make
certain evidence conclusive with regard to a specific
matter, but it may not interfere with powers conferred or duties imposed by the Constitution. This
in effect is what is attempted to be done in section
2, c. 72, p. 112, aforesaid. To the extent that the
provisions of that section are in conflict with the
constitutional provision governing salaries and compensations of officers fixed by law, the Constitution
must prevail. * * *" (Emphasis added.)

1

1
1

J
I

Uintah State Bank v. Ajax, 77 Utah 455, 297 Pac. 434,
was an action seeking mandamus against the State Auditor
to compel issuance of warrants in payment of bounty certificates. Admittedly, all the requirements of the bounty law
had been met and the sole question was whether the bounty
claims must be approved by the Board of Examiners before
payment where the applicable statute made no such requirement. The Court held first that the bounty claims
were- claims against the State as they were claims for
money "paid into the state treasury * * * subject to
appropriation by the Legislature, and [payable only] by
the state treasurer on warrant of the state auditor." It
was argued that the claims were fixed by law at so much
per pelt, became liquidated demands when the county clerk
certified the number of pelts, and thus did not come within
the jurisdiction of the Board. The Court replied that the
only exception to the jurisdiction of the Board is "salaries
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and compensation of officers fixed by law." Furthermore,
(77 Utah at 465) :
"If we should adopt petitioner's view it would
follow that the Legislature might designate any officer other than the board of examiners as authorized
in behalf of the state to settle, fix, or liquidate
claims and agree upon the amount to be paid thereon, and thereby exclude the board of examiners from
its duty and responsibility with respect to claims
thus liquidated pursuant to legislative authority.
We cannot agree to any such construction of the
constitutional language, nor may we by construction
interpolate the word 'unliquidated' into the Constitution so that it would provide that the board of
examiners have power to 'examine all unliquidated
claims against the State,' etc. The Constitution has
vested in the board of examiners the power to
examine and pass on all claims except those exempted, and the Legislature is without authority
to delegate such power to any other board or officer."

It is obvious from the above quotation and by the
Court's reliance on language from State v. Edwards, supra,
that the Court was speaking of the authority of the Board '
of Examiners under the Constitution not merely its authority under statutes declaratory of the Board's constitutional
powers.
The most recent case relating to the authority of the
Board of Examiners is State Board of Education v. Commission of Finance, (Utah 1952), 247 P. 2d 435. It is true
that the principal question in that case was the legality of
the composition of the Board of Education which was raised
as a defense to a claim for payment of the salary of the
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State Superintendent of Public Instruction, but it is significant that more than one-third of the argument of the Board
of Education was devoted to a discussion of the exclusive
constitutional jurisdiction of the Board of Examiners. (See
S. Ct. Briefs and Abstracts, Case No. 7785.) The validity
of this argument was recognized when the Court said (247
P. 2d at 439) :
"At a meeting of the State Board of Education
on October 5, 1951, the Board appointed Dr. Bateman to the office of State Superintendent of Public
Instruction and fixed his salary at $10,000 per annum. The Board of Examiners (composed of the
Governor, Secretary of State and the Attorney General) which must approve all salary claims against
the state, except those fixed by law, approved by a
vote of two to one the request of the Board of Education to pay Dr. Bateman a salary of $10,000 per
annum." (Emphasis added.)
See also Wilkinson v. State, 42 Utah 483, 134 Pac. 626; Dall
v. State, 42 Utah 498, 134 Pac. 632; Campbell Bldg. Co. v.

State Road Comm., 95 Utah 242, 70 P. 2d 857, all of which
held the Board of Examiners, not the courts, has exclusive
jurisdiction of claims against the State.
The Idaho cases conform to the above decisions in Utah.
In Pyke v. Steunenberg, 5 Ida. 614, 51 Pac. 614, it was held
that the Board of Examiners must approve a claim for
supplies furnished the state insane asylum, a state institution created by the constitution (Art. X, Sec. 1, Idaho Constitution). This was so even though the board of directors
for the insane asylum had audited and approved the claim.
The court expressly recognized the discretionary powers of
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the Board and refused to order it to decide in a certain way.
The court did order the Board to take some action but refused to order a certain decision to be made.

Bragaw v. Gooding, 14 Ida. 288, 94 Pac. 438, presented
the situation of disapproval by the Board of Examiners of
the salary of certain employees of the State Auditor, a constitutional state officer (Art. IV, Sec. 1, Idaho Constitution) . The court upheld the Board even though it was admitted that the employees were necessary for the conduct
of the office, that without them the auditor could not perform the duties required of him by law, and that the salaries were just and within the appropriation made by the
Legislature. The court held it was without power to set
aside and annul the constitution and statutes of Idaho by
overturning the Board's decision. The court stated:
"If the contention of the plaintiff be correct
that it was the duty of the State Board of Examiners
to allow the claims as he presented them, then there
would be no necessity for a state board of examiners
so far as the auditor's office was concerned, as he
would be his own examining board and could allow
such claims as he might deem proper so long as the
same were within the appropriation made by the
Legislature. This, in effect, would take from the
State Board of Examiners the authority expressly
given it by the Constitution and laws of this state."
(94 Pac. at 440.)
In State ex rel. Ha.nsen v. Pa'rsons, 57 Ida. 775, 69 P.
2d 788, the court considered a statute appropriating money
to cover expenditures from the state insurance fund incurred in excess of the appropriations for the previous
biennium. These· claims had not been approved by the Board
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of Examiners before the Legislature enacted the subsequent
appropriation. The court held this unconstitutional since
the Constitution of Idaho prohibited the Legislature from
passing upon claims which had not been considered and
acted on by the Board of Examiners. The previous Idaho
cases were discussed and the constitutional jurisdiction and
authority of the Board of Examiners was reaffirmed.
In State ex rel. Taylor v. Robinson, 59 Ida. 486, 83 P.
2d 983, the court held individual claims for unemployment
compensation must be passed upon by the Board of Examiners even though federal funds in the custody of the
State Treasurer were used to pay such claims.
"No reflection upon the board or any of its
employees is intended or asserted by this argument,
but the Constitution sets up what were considered
by its framers a.s essential safeguards as to the expenditure of public funds generally. All funds in
the hands of and under the control of the Statethe only exception being as to the coordinate constitutional body the State Board of Education-must
be disbursed under the supervision and control of
the State Board of Examiners, and the people by
not amending the Constitution in these particulars
have continued to sanction and leave effective these
safeguards, and asserted expediency, if there be
such, may not dissolve them." (83 P. 2d at 985,
emphasis added.)
In Suppiger v. Enking, 60 Ida. 392, 91 P. 2d 362, the
.~ourt held that appropriations could not be used by any
>tate agency to establish revolving funds without the ap~Jroval of the Board of Examiners.
See also Gem Irr. District v. Gallet, 43 Ida. 519, 253
,:Jac. 128; Curtis v. Moore, 38 Ida. 198, 221 Pac. 133; Davis
I
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v. State, 30 Ida. 137, 163 Pac. 373; Epperson v. HoweU, 2~
Ida. 338, 154 Pac. 621; Kroutinger v. Board of Examiners,
8 Ida. 463, 69 Pac. 279.
In Nevada, the case of State v. Hallock, 20 Nev. 326,
22 Pac. 123, is in point. A statute appropriated money and
authorized counties to claim reimbursement for expenses
incurred as agents of the state in the conduct of a special
election. The claim was to be certified by the respective
boards of county commissioners and the state controller
was then required to draw his warrant for the amount
certified. Mandamus was sought against the controller for
refusing to draw his warrant for the full amount of such
a claim. He defended on the ground that the Board of
Examiners had approved a lesser amount than that certified by the county. The court upheld this contention even
though the statute in question did not require approval
by the Board of Examiners. Other statutes (similar to
the Utah statutes listed in Stipulation, par. 5, p. 3, R. 27)
required approval by the Board of Examiners. The court
stated that these other statutes required submission to the
Board of Examiners ; and it added, assuming these general
statutes were repealed as to claims under the election statute, the Constitution of Nevada itself required submission
to the Board of Examiners and gave it the power to approve
or disapprove such claims. The court further said in an·
swer to the argument that a claim authorized by statute
and appropriation was not within the jurisdiction of the
Board:
"The most numerous and important claimJ
against t~e state arise from the contingent expe:M63'
incurred in support of the government, and which
1
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must be met as they arise. In view of the manifest
purpose of the constitution to protect the treasury
by requiring the board of examiners to adjust all
claims, it cannot be held that the many and important claims arising against the state, and which, as
claims, have never been acted upon by the legislature, are exempted from the investigation of the
board. Without stating at length the various positions taken by relator, there is an insuperable objection common to all. Each contention involves an
exemption of the claim of the county from the action of the board of examiners, and each is conclusively answered by the provisions of the constitution defining the duties of the board. It is not
within the power of the legislature to confer this
authority elsewhere." (22 Pac. at 124, emphasis
add~d.)

The Montana cases have restricted the authority and
;: jurisdiction of Montana's Board of Examiners contrary
~to our contentions, but in doing so are contrary to the
,. weight of authority as shown by the Utah, Idaho and
~ Nevada cases.
2.

The Jurisdiction of the Board of Examiners
Includes Claims of State Officers for Salaries
Not Fixed by Law.

The court below decreed that expenditures of all state
departments and agencies were claims within the j urisdic'tion of the Board of Examiners (Par. 5, R. 70, 73). This
'is in accordance with the Utah cases of State v. Edwards,
supra, and State Board of Education v. Commission of
1
Finance, supra, as well as the Idaho cases cited. However,
:two exceptions were made: Compensation of officers fixed
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by law, and salaries of state officers and employees whether
fixed by law or not (Par. 4, R. 70, 73). With the first
exception, we agree-with the last, we disagree.
The Board shall "examine all claims against the State
except salaries or compensation of officers fixed by law
* * * and no claim against the State, except salaries
and compensation of officers fixed by law, shall be passed
upon by the Legislature without having been considered
and acted upon by the said Board of Examiners." The trial
judge reasoned correctly, we believe, that "salaries" and
"compensation" are not synonymous terms. (See Marion,.
eaux v. Cutler, 32 Utah 475, 91 Pac. 355, where it was determined that "compensation" included mileage even though
mileage might not be considered a salary.) But then, the
court went on to state that the term "fixed by law'' modi·
fies only "compensation" and not "salaries," concluding
therefrom that all "salaries," whether fixed by law or not,
are excepted from the jurisdiction of the Board.
The State Board of Education has previously been before
this Court in a mandamus action to compel the payment
of the salary of the State Superintendent of Public Instruc·
tion, which salary had been "fixed" by the State Board of
Education, State Board of Education v. Commission of
Finance, supra*. Clearly the suit involved payment of a
"salary" not "compensation," a fact noted by the Court in
stating that the Board of Examiners "which must approve
all salary claims against the State, except those fixed by
*Note: The case arose prior to Chap. 80, Laws of 1953 by which
statute .the Legisl~ture fixed the salary of the State Sup~rintendent
of Pubhc Instruction.
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law" had approved the disputed salary claim. In State v.
Edwards, supra, the plaintiff state employee argued that
his claim for mileage previously approved by the District
Judge, as provided by statute, was fixed by law and thus
within the exception. After stating the rule and citing
authorities that the salary or compensation of public officers fixed by law could be enforced by mandamus, the Court
stated (93 Pac. at 722) :
"* * * But all these authorities simply
make it clear that the salary or compensation, of
which payment may be compelled in such a proceeding, must be certain and fixed by law, and, further,
that it must appear that it is the legal duty of the
officer, upon whom the demand is made, to allow
or pay the amount claimed. We have not been able
to find any case where the compensation was fixed
by contract, or where the amount is subject to change
at the pleasure of the person authorized to agree
upon and fix it, wherein it was held that such compensation is one fixed by law. The mere fact that
the Legislature has, in effect, made the certificate of
the judge the only evidence that is required to fix
the amount due, cannot affect the conclusion that
it is not fixed by law. It is the judge, and not the
law, that determines and fixes the amount to be
allowed under the particular contract under which
the stenographer claims."
In Bragaw v. Gooding, supra, it was admitted by demurrer that the State Auditor could employ and fix salaries
of clerks and assistants. The court had no difficulty in
holding that the Board of Examiners had acted within its
jurisdiction in disapproving the salaries thus fixed.
Thus, the proper interpretation of the exception limits
it (1) to claims for salaries or compensation (2) fixed by
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the Legislature in a sum certain ( 3) as an incident to a
public office. For example, the salary of the State Superintendent of Public Instruction, a public officer, has been
fixed by the Legislature in a sum certain. (Section 53-2-8,
Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended by Ch. 80, Laws
of 1953.) But, by the same section, the Board of Education
is authorized to appoint "assistant superintendents, directors, supervisors, assistants, clerical workers and other
employees," most of whom would be considered employees
rather than officers (McCormick v. Thatcher, 8 Utah 294,
30 Pac. 1091), and whose "salaries * * * shall be fixed
by the board" rather than by the Legislature. As to the
former, the Legislature has exercised the required supervision of public funds; as to the latter, the constitutional
powers of the Board of Examiners must be called into play.
B.

The Discretionary Authority of the Board of Examiners.

As previously noted, the trial court determined that
all expenditures of the State Board of Education, with two
exceptions discussed above, are claims which must be examined by the Board of Examiners. The court held, however, that the examination was limited to "auditorial supervision" and the Board "cannot exercise discretion or review
the wisdom of the expenditures." (Par. 5, R. 70, 73, Opinion, R. 65.) This, we contend, is contrary to the Utah,
Idaho and Nevada cases.

Thoreson v. Board of Examiners, 19 Utah 18, 21 Utah
187, 60 Pac. 982, was the first Utah case construing the
authority of the Board of Examiners. The Court in that
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case ordered the Board to approve a claim under a state
of facts where the Board admitted the justness of the claim
but denied its legality. The Court said (21 Utah at 189) :
"We do not hold, as intimated in appellant's
brief, that the Board of Examiners is a mere per~
functory body, not capable of exercising any judgment or discretion in matters of allowing or rejecting claims against the state, but hold that in the
particulars mentioned in this case, where the claim
is admitted to be just, the Board had no discretion,
but their duties were mandatory."
Thus, the case holds that the Board of Examiners exercises
discretionary powers as to the justness of claims but where
the justness of the claim is admitted, the Court can compel
.the Board to approve a legal claim. The case does not stand
for the proposition that only ministerial functions are performed by the Board but holds where only a question of
law is involved-the legality of the particular claim-a
court can correct an erroneous interpretation of law by
ithe Board.

State v. Cutler, 34 Utah 99, 95 Pac. 1071, enunciates
,:the same principles as the Thoreson Case. The Court stated
:. (34 Utah at 102) :
"Indeed there is no dispute with regard to any
matter of fact, but the board justify their action in
disallowing the claim entirely upon questions of
law * * * "
ilAnd further (34 Utah at 107):
"In this case the essential facts entitling the
relator to have his claim audited and allowed are
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all admitted. The questions, therefore, are purelJ
questions of law. If the claim, t?erefore,. is on!
which is admitted to be just, and 1s authonzed b~
law, and there is no dispute with regard to any facl
involved, and the claim is presented to the board in
due form as the law requires, we know of no law
nor reason why respondents, although acting in a
quasi-judicial capacity, should not be required to
audit and allow the claim."
After determining that the Board had decided the question
of law erroneously, the Court concluded by stating (34 Utah
at 108):
"In view of the conceded facts, there is nothing
upon which the respondents can legally exercise any
discretionary powers in this case, and therefore they
should have audited and allowed the claims."
Thus, the Court expressly recognized the discretionary,
quasi-judicial authority of the Board to deny claims it
considers unjust, unnecessary, or unwise, but held that
where the justness is admitted and only a question of law
is involved, a court can review the Board's determination.
The same principle was involved in Marioneaux v.
Cutler, supra, the only difference being that the Board's
interpretation of the law was sustained as correct.
In the Idaho cases of Pyke v. Steunenberg, supra, and
Bragaw v. Gooding, supra, the discretionary powers of the
Board of Examiners were discussed. Because of the discretion residing in the Board, the court held it was power·
less to require the Board to decide in a certain way. The
same rule has been consistently applied in the more recent
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Idaho cases cited. For example, in Suppiger v. Enking,
supra, the court said:
"The board of examiners has sole and discretionary authority to decide how and in what manner
it will pass upon and allow or reject claims against
the state." (91 P. 2d at 366.)
It is the law in Utah, as well as in most other states,
that the State Auditor has only ministerial powers. See
State Board of Land Commissioners, et al. v. Ririe, 56 Utah
213, 190 Pac. 59. He can refuse to draw warrants for claims
submitted to him only if the claim is unlawful and he will
be subject to mandamus by a court if it is later determined
that the claim is lawful. But, it is a Board of Examiners
we are concerned with here, not an auditor or controllerexamination of claims, not auditorial supervision of expenditures.

The distinction is pointed up in Uintah State Bank v.
Ajax, supra, and State v. Edwards, supra, in both of which
cases mandamus was sought against the State Auditor.
The Auditor successfully defended both actions not on the
ground that he, as Auditor, had discretionary authority to
disapprove the claims, but on the ground that the claims
had not been presented to and approved by the Board of
Examiners. This Court, in holding the claims must be
submitted to the Board of Examiners, was not requiring
a mere formality-a gesture to governmental red tape.
Would it have required the plaintiffs in those cases to submit their claims to the Board of Examiners if the Board had
no discretion to examine and approve or disapprove the
claims? This Court realized that the Board of Examiners is
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a quasi-judicial body having power to exe:ccise its own independent judgment and discretion as to the justness of
the claims it examines.
The Board of Examiners was designed by our founding fathers as an agency to check on all expenditures of
the State. The Auditor, on the other hand, was intended
to act as an investigating officer as to the financial condition and expenditures of the State, to provide accounting
information and to determine whether improper disposition
of state money had been made. His functions are analogous
to a certified public accountant who makes a periodic review of the accounts, expenditures and financial condition
of a business. But greater protection is needed for public
funds. A check on expenditures in necessary before the
money is paid out. Revelations of improprieties after the
money has been dispensed are often too late to allow recovery. Some check before money is disbursed is needed.
This is the responsibility of the Board of Examiners. It is a
constitutional duty which can only be restricted by constitutional amendment.
C.

The Constitutional Powers of the Board of E.raminers Cannot Be Restricted by the Legisla.ture.

The trial court held that the Legislature may modify
the constitutional powers of the Board of Examiners (Par.
6, R. 70, 73). This, we contend, is an erroneous interpretation of Article VII, Section 13, Utah Constitution, based
on a faulty reading of the "until otherwise provided by
law" proviso at the beginning of the section.
Article VII, Section 13, deals with two subjects, the
Board of State Prison Commissioners and the Board of
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Examiners. The "until otherwise profided by law" clause
is contained in the first sentence of the section, which relates solely and exclusively to the composition and powers
of the Board of State Prison Commissioners. The proviso
in question is not repeated nor incorporated in the second
sentence of the section dealing with the composition and
powers of the Board of Examiners. To relate the clause to
the second sentence, all rules of grammar and the meaning
of words must be ignored, for to do so one has to consider
the word "they" in the second sentence of Article VII, Section 13, as referring back to and including not only the
named officials but also the proviso in question. Since the
use of the personal pronoun normally, if not necessarily,
refers only to previously named individuals, such an extension of language is not warranted.
But assuming this was the intention of the framers of
our Constitution, the section would then read as follows:
"Until otherwise provided by law, the Governor,
Secretary of State and Attorney General * * *
shall, also, constitute a Board of Examiners, * * *."
Following the quoted clause is the enumeration of the powers and duties of the Board of Examiners. Even read in
this manner, it is clear that the "until otherwise provided
by law" clause modifies only the clause stating who shall
constitute the Board of Examiners. It has nothing to do
with the powers and duties of the Board of Examiners. If
the "otherwise provided by law" statement was intended
to affect both the membership of the Board and its powers
as well, there would be no reason for the term "other duties"
nor for the clause "as may be prescribed by law." That is,
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the framers did not say the Board of Examiners should
exercise certain specified duties and "such other duties as
may be prescribed by law" "until otherwise provided by
law." Thus, taking this rather far-fetched interpretation
of the section, the most that can be said for the opening
clause is that the Legislature may designate officials other
than the Governor, Secretary of State and Attorney General
to act as a Board of Examiners. Such an interpretation
does not allow the Legislature to qualify the duties of the
Board, however constituted, to examine claims against the
State. The debates in the Constitutional Convention, though
somewhat sketchy, support this interpretation. There were
no debates on Article VII, Section 13, as such. However,.
the same committee drafted Sections 12, 13, 14 and 15 and
all sections were considered by the Convention more or
less as a whole. Thus, the principles discussed in the debates on Section 12, relating to the Board of Pardons, are
relevant to Section 13.
The arguments on Section 12 of Article VII ran all
the way from contending that the Governor should have
the exclusive pardoning power to contending that the Justices of the Supreme Court and the Attorney General should
not be members of the Board of Pardons. The question was,
who should exercise the pard~:ming power, not \Yhat the
powers would be. But, there was no suggestion that the
Legislature itself exercise the pardoning power or be able
to impose restrictions or qualifications on the power of
whoever was given the authority to grant pardons.
On a reconsideration of the entire executive article, the
"until otherwise provided by law" proviso was added to
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Sections 12, 13, 14 and 15. (Vol. II, Proceedings Utah
Constitutional Convention, 1152.) It is significant that
after this proviso was added, the following substitute to
Section 12 was offered but rejected. (II Ibid. 1153) :
"The governor, secretary of state, and attorney
general shall constitute a board of pardons and shall
have power to grant [pardons, etc.] * * * subject to such regulations as may be provided by law."
It is apparent that had this substitute carried, the pardon'ing power could have been restricted and controlled by the
_Legislature. That a substitute to the section as it now
'~tands was needed to accomplish this demonstrates that the
_'until otherwise provided by law" proviso was not intended
l
;o qualify the powers granted by the Constitution but only
;o allow the Legislature to change the membership of these
~~onstitutional boards.
io

But, we need not rely solely on the constitutional de>ates, for the Supreme Court has expressly held in Bishop
[
t. State Board of Corrections, 16 Utah 478, 52 Pac. 1090,
chat the Legislature could not deprive the Board of Pardons
::,f its constitutional powers. The Legislature had empow~~red the Board of Corrections rather than the Board of
i:')ardons to parole convicts under certain restrictions and
~-imitations. This was held unconstitutional. Accord : Car!r(isco v. Davis, 91 Utah 323, 64 P. 2d 216. See also In re
';'!lint, 25 Utah 338, 71 Pac. 531 (a court cannot exercise the
~1 ,ardoning power) .
Consideration should also be given to the particular
lt'rording of Sections 12, 13, 14 and 15 of Article VII, Utah
I~
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Constitution. Consistent with the debates and cases above
cited, the sections provide that the members of the various
boards shall be certain named state officials "until other.
wise provided by law." For every board but the Board of
Examiners, the Legislature has exercised its prerogative
by providing a different membership. But as to the powers
of the various boards, the framers were careful to desig.
nate whether and to what extent the Legislature could
change their powers. For example, in Section 12, the Board
of Pardons is given power to pardon "subject to such reg.
ulations as may be provided by law, relative to the manner
of applying for pardons." The Legislature then can only
regulate the manner of applying for pardons. On the other
hand, the Board of State Prison Commissioners "shall have
such supervision * * * as may be provided by law,"
a clear statement authorizing complete legislative regulation. The same statement is repeated in Sections 14 and
15. Compare this with the grant of power to the Board
of Examiners to examine all claims against the State and
"perform such other duties as may be prescribed by law."
Here the Legislature can only prescribe duties other than
the duty to examine claims against the State.

1

Finally, the position of the trial court is directly con·
trary to the Utah, Idaho and Nevada cases discussed above,
particularly the Utah cases of State v. Edu·ards, supra, and
Uintah State Bank v. Ajax, supra. All of these cases ex·
pressly recognize the constitutional authority of the Board
of Examiners and state that the Legislature has no power
to interfere with this constitutional authoritY
..
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POINT II
BY STATUTE, THE BOARD OF EXAMINERS
HAS DISCRETIONARY AUTHORITY TO APPROVE OR DISAPPROVE EXPENDITURES
OF THE STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION.
Section 53-3-9, Utah Code Annotated 1953, provides
as follows:
"At the end of each month the state superintendent shall file with the state board of examiners
an itemized account of his expenses, including those
of the state board of education, verified by his oath.
The said board shall examine the same, and if the
account is found to be correct and the expenditures
necessary, shall certify the same to the state auditor.
The state auditor shall issue a warrant on the state
treasurer for the amount due on such account, and
at the end of each month he shall issue his warrant
for one-twelfth of the superintendent's annual salary."
This provision has been a part of our law since 1896 (Sec.
18, Ch. CXX, Laws of 1896). It provides explicitly not only
for review of expenditures of the Board of Education by
the Board of Examiners, but also for disapproval by the
Board of Examiners if they deem the expenditures unnecessary. Such a statute is, of course, only declaratory of the
·Board of Examiner's constitutional responsibilities and we
do not wish to minimize our argument in Point I to that
effect. But this statute makes clear that the Legislature,
as well as the framers of our Constitution, have consistently
adhered to a policy of requiring a check on expenditures of
state agencies by the Board of Examiners.
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Consideration should also be given to the declaratory
statutes relating to the Board of Examiners (Stipulation,
Par. 5, pp. 3, 4, R. 27), one of which states the Board has
jurisdiction over claims for which an appropriation has
been made.
With respect to salaries, every appropriations act since
1949 (Stipulation, Par. 7, 8, R. 28), including the 1955
act (Sec. 12, Ch. 164, Laws of 1955), has contained an
E·xplicit directive to the Board of Examiners to regulate
salary schedules and control working conditions.
POINT III
THE COMMISSION OF FINANCE, AS AGENT
OF THE BOARD OF EXAMINERS OR BY
STATUTE, HAS POWER TO APPROVE OR
DISAPPROVE EXPENDITURES MADE BY
THE STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION.
The Commission of Finance was created in 1941 as a :
part of a comprehensive reorganization of state depart- ,
ments and agencies. The purpose and need for this reor- '
ganization is set out in Governor Maw's opening message
to the Twenty-Fourth Legislature. (See House Jourrwl,
1941 Regular Session, page 6; Senate Journal, 1941 Regular
Session, page 23.) His proposals and the action taken by
the Legislature followed similar plans undertaken by
almost every state since 1900, reorganizations which are
still being carried on. See the discussion in H O'i(.Se v. Creveling, 147 Tenn. 589, 250 S. W. 357, particularly at 363.
There are many treatises on this general subject which we
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commend for the Court's consideration, particularly the
following: Bollens, John C., Administrative Reorganizar
tion of the States Since 1939, University of California,
Bureau of Public Administration, Berkeley, April 16, 1947;
Buck A. E., The Reorganization of State Governments in
the United States, New York City, Columbia University
Press, 1938; Reorganizing State Government, The Council
of State Governments, 1950.
The basic purpose of all reorganization plans, including Utah's plan, is to obtain increased economy and efficiency in state government by centralizing authority, usually in the Governor, or as Governor Maw stated, to give
Utah a state government rather than a government of a
hundred separate units (House Journal, Ibid, page 12;
Senate Journal, Ibid, page 29). Vital to this plan was centralized control of expenditures of all state departments
and agencies. The result was the creation of the Commission of Finance. Its workings were well described in Professor G. Homer Durham's 1947 Report to the Tax Study
;Committee of the 1945 Legislature, entitled Utilization of
Tax Resources by State Government in Utah. He states,
,on page 43:
"Actually, the existing system of financial administration focuses responsibility on the Department of Finance. This department, created in 1941,
lies at the heart of State government. On it, the
legislature and the executive branch must largely
rely for enforcement of the appropriation act and
the maintenance of legal financial service. Section
82C, Chapter two, Utah Code Annotated 1943, affords an excellent basis for such service and control.
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Under this statute the Department of Finance has
the legal authority and obligation to:
"'1. Prescribe and maintain a schedule of salaries and job classifications for all State
employees except where salaries are fixed
by statute.
" '2. Examine all requests for personnel with
power to approve or disapprove the same.
" '3.

Authorize travel expense and set up rules
and regulations governing the same.

" '4.

Maintain a budget and accounting system
and exercise accounting and budgetary
control over all State deparbnents.

"'5.

Purchase supplies, materials, equipment1
and services required in the administration of State departn1ents.'

In a very real sense, this phase of the 1941 reorganization program provided, for the first time, an
adequate 'house-keeping' agency in Utah 3tate government."
Although noting its relationship to the Board of Examiners
should be clarified, Professor Durham strongly endorsed'
the work of the Commission and recommended that its
powers be strengthened. He particularly approved of the
1
Commission's functions in reviewing expenditures, stating
that this policing duty is "healthy" and has been properly
exercised.
The duty of the Commission of Finance to review ex·
penditures is declared in 63-2-21, Utah Code Annotated:.
1953, as follows :
"The commission of finance shall exercise ac·
counting control over all state departments and
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agencies and prescribe the 1nanner and method of
certifying that funds are available and adequate to
meet all contracts and obligations. The commission
shall examine and approve, or disapprove, all requisitions and proposed expenditures of the several departments, except salaries or compensation of officers .fixed by law, and no requisition of any of the
departments shall be allowed nor shall any obligation
be created without the approv·al and certification of
the commission. The commission of finance shall
pre-audit all claims against the state. The commission of finance shall, with the approval of the state
auditor as to the adequacy of such documents in facilitating the post-audit of public accounts, prescribe
all forms of requisitions, receipts, vouchers, bills or
claims to be used by the several departments and the
forms, procedures, and records to be maintained by
all departmental, institutional or agency store rooms
and exercise inventory control over such store
rooms." (Emphasis added.)

It was soon apparent that the italicized sentence, if
literally applied, divested the Board of Examiners of its
iconstitutional powers. The Attorney General was asked
:for advice on this problem and replied in the opinion set
~forth in Stipulation, Exhibit A, pp. 13-21, R. 43-51. His
'~onclusion was that construing the constitutional powers
·::3f the Board of Examiners and the statutory powers of the
~8ommission of Finance together, the Commission of Finance
must be considered to be only an agent for the Board of
1~xaminers in the matter of the approval or disapproval of
~~laims against the State. This has been the consistent in;erpretation followed since that time.
~!L"a .matter of_ p:r;~~tjce, _the. Co:romis§i()n. of . Finance
Jtletermines the mathematical accuracy of the claims and

·a
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the availability of funds; the Board of Examiners is pri:~
m;:~fly concerned with the justness or advisability of the
'expenditures. for which the claims are made, reserving th~
power to control the actions of the Commission .of Fina.E_9!
.in other matters relating to claims against the State. This
has been the practice and, we contend, the correct practice
in view of the express constitutional powers granted the
Board of Examiners which we have discussed in Point I.
However, if the Court considers this administrative
interpretation and practice to be erroneous, we contend, as
an alternative, that the Commission of Finance has statutory authority pursuant to 63-2-13 and 63-2-21, Utah Code
Annotated 1953, to approve or disapprove expenditures
made by all departments of the State. The language of
63-2-21 is unequivocal: "The Commission shall examine
and approve, or disapprove." The authority given is comprehensive, applicable to all expenditures of all departments with only the one exception of salaries or compen·
sation of officers fixed by law. Based on the purpose of
the reorganization plan, and the language used, it is clear
the Legislature intended all departments to be subject to
this control, including the Board of Education. It is also
clear that the Legislature intended the Commission to prevent unnecessary or unwise expenditures as well as illegal
expenditures for which no funds are available. Otherwise,
the sentence requiring examination and approval or disapproval would be unnecessary and meaningless.
Salary claims are treated somewhat differently under
the reorganization plan. Pursuant to 63-2-13, Utah Code
Annotated 1953, the Commission of Finance, after study,
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prescribes a salary schedule for the various types and
classes of employment in all state departments. After
such a s·chedule has been adopted, no salary claim can be
paid in excess of the salary fixed in the schedule without
express approval of the Commission of Finance. Consistent with the Attorney General's opinion above referred
to, the salary schedule before adoption is referred to the
Board of Examiners for its approval and claims for salaries
in excess of the schedule must be separately approved by
the Board. (See Stipulation, Pars. 10-11, p. 5, R. 29-30.)
The obvious purpose and sound policy behind such a procedure is to prev~nt different pay for the same work. It
would be unjust to employees if different pay were
awarded for the same work merely because different departments were involved. Also, it would lead to lobbying
for additional appropriations by the departments so that
each could attract employees from the others by higher
salaries.
Most of the cases resulting from state administrative
:reorganizations have involved provisions allowing a desig;nated state official or finance department to disapprove
:.salaries fixed by another state board or official. But, it
)s obvious that salary expenditures have no different status
~than non-salary expenditures so that cases on one aspect
~are in point as to the other.
In State ex rel. Yapp v. Chase, 165 Minn. 268,206 N. W.
396, the Commission of Administration and Finance was
Jiauthorized to fix salaries "for the various classes, grades,
Jand titles" of all employees in all departments of the State.
r:The Railroad and Industrial Commission, under a statute
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giving it power to fix the salaries of its employees, fixed
the salaries of certain employees in excess of the schedule
adopted by the Commission of Administration and Finance.
The court held the salary fixing power of the Industrial
Commission to be restricted to the fixing of salaries not in
excess of the schedule adopted by the Commission of Administration and Finance.
In State v. Manning, 220 Iowa 525, 259 N. W. 213, the
court sustained the discretionary power of a financial offi.
cer to disapprove transfer of funds from one budget item
to another. In its opinion the court made this pertinent
statement (259 N. W. at 220) :
"The Legislature might have said that he should
consent to the transfer when in his judgment it
would be for the best interests of the taxpayers of
the municipality, or when from his exa..111ination of
the estimates on file as compared with the prior
two years, he deemed it expedient or proper, or
when in his judgment it could be safely done, or
similar general expressions. All this is implied and
is inherent in the very nature and purpose of the
Budget Act, and the Legislature having entrusted
the supervisory and directing power in his han~
it certainly can be presumed that in his quasi-judi·
cial function, coupled with his administrative, supervisory, and directory powers, he will act in the best
interests of the taxpaying public."
In Reeves v. Talbot, 289 ~\:y. 581, 159 S. \V. 2d 51,
central review by the Commission of Finance of all travel
requisitions was sustained. As chief financial officer of
the state, the Commissioner of Finance was characterized~
by the court as "the watchdog of the treasury" with not
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only accounting functions but discretionary authority to
pass on the propriety and justification of proposed expenditures of all departments of the state. The court said :
"The legislature realized that the determination
of incurring expenses for travel outside the state
had to be left to the discretion of somebody, and
believed it could well be left with the heads of the
departments to whom it had granted so much
greater and more important powers. But that is not
all. Doubtless realizing that the strength of our
form of government lies in its system of checks and
balances which curbs the abuse of official power,
the authority to approve or disapprove the action
of the heads of departments in such matters, as well
as in other contemplated disbursements, was lodged
with the Commissioner of Finance * * * "
The court further stated:
"Considering the relative rights and powers of
the heads of the departments and of the Commissioner of Finance in this matter, it seems to us that
when an executive officer makes a requisition in
accordance with the statutes, the exercise of his
discretion as to the propriety and legitimacy of the
travel outside the state is entitled to high regard
and influential consideration. It is especially his
responsibility. If the requisition reveals a good
· and sufficient reason for incurring the proposed
expenditure, we think the Commissioner of Finance
should regard it as prima facie valid and proper and
that he may rely upon those representations and
approve the requisition if the purpose is within the
scope of the appropriation for the department and
the amount is within the unexpended balance to the
credit of the particular fund. If that is the condition he will be shielded from liability. It is not to
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be overlooked that that officer has a second chance
to review and control the payment of the claim. for
reimbursement when it shall be presented. Sections
340, 359a-1, 359a-4, Statutes. On the other hand, if
in the exercise of a sound judgment the Commissioner is of opinion that the proposed travel is not
legitimate or proper, considering the functions of
the department and the nature of the duties of the
officer or employee and, as well, the purpose and
character of the business to be attended to or if he
regards the proposed expenditure as prima facie excessive, or if he acertains that it will exceed the
balance of funds allotted to the department, he
should disapprove the requisition in the manner
prescribed by the statute."
A similar situation was presented in SeUers v. Frohmiller, 42 Ariz. 239, 24 P. 2d 666, where a provision of an
appropriations act required the Governor's approval as to
legality and necessity for proposed travel expenditures.
Although holding the requirement invalid because of an
unique provision of the Arizona Constitution prohibiting
appropriations acts containing other than appropriated
amounts, the court said :
"The passage of section 6 was undoubtedly
prompted by a legislative desire to take from the
auditor the control and supervision of the expenditure of appropriations for operation and travel and
place it under the governor, and, in addition, to
require every officer, before using any part of the
sum appropriated to his department for these purposes to show to the Governor the necessity for its
use· and procure from him a requisition therefor.
The accomplishment of this end it is clear is a
ri.ghtful and proper subject of iegislation, but in
VIew of sec. 20, supra, providing that the general
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appropriations bill shall embrace nothing but appropriations for the different departments of the
state, it is equally clear that it cannot be done as a
part of that bill."
Another Arizona case, Industrial Commission v. Price,
37 Ariz. 245, 292 Pac. 1099, involyed a statute authorizing
the Industrial Commission to appoint and fix the salaries
of its employees but providing, "Such employment and their
compensation shall be first approved by the governor
* * * " It was contended that the Governor had only
a ministerial duty and the Industrial Commission was the
sole judge of the help needed and the amount of their compensation. Holding that the Governor had discretion to
disapprove employment or the compensation thereof, the
court said:
"The Governor has nothing much to say as to
who the employees shall be, but much to say as to
their necessity. He has nothing to say as to the fixing of their compensation, but, if such compensation
as fixed by the commission seems to him to be excessive, he may disapprove it."

It was further contended that with such a power, the Govt ernor could dominate the administration of the Industrial
; Commission. To this argument the court replied that the
; purpose of the Legislature was merely to have a check on
( expenditures of the Industrial Commission, a proper sub! ject for legislation.
i,

In Wycoff v. W. H. Wheeler & Co., 38 Okla. 771, 135
, Pac. 399, a statute required the Governor's approval of
' publisher's bonds for all contracts made by the State Board

1

I
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of Education acting as a State Textbook Commission. This
was held to vest discretion in the Governor to approve or
disapprove such bonds, a discretion which a court could not
control.
In California, a state which has served as the model
for so many of our laws, a Department of Finance is vested
with the power to review expenditures. In Ireland v. Riley,
11 Cal. App. 2d 70, 52 P. 2d 1021, the court held that contracts for liquor stamps made by the Board of Equalization
must be approved by the Department of Finance. The court
characterized the purpose of the California financial reorganization as follows:
"The unmistakable purpose of the Legislature
in [creating the Department of Finance] is to conserve the financial interests of the state, and to prevent, as far as possible, any improvident acts by any
of the departments thereof; to give to the state such
powers as would enable the department of finance
to control the expenditures of state money by any
of the several departn1ents of the state. The general
powers extend to the supervision of all the financial
and business policies of the state, which necessarily
include supervision of the expenditure of moneys
belonging to the state."
The above case and the quotation therefrom was affirmed
in the more recent cases of State v. Brotherhood of Railway
Train~men, 37 Cal. 2d 412, 232 P. 2d S51, and Treu v. Kirkwood, (Cal. 1953), 255 P. 2d -~09, both of which involved
review of salaries by the Department of Finance.
The above cases clearly hold that a check by one department or official on the exercise of the powers of another
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department or official is constitutional and proper. Indeed
the courts have applauded the internal system of checks
and balances thus established. The State Board of Education in effect contends that it has the right to be as extravagant as it desires, that it can pay excessive salaries, that
it can make unnecessary purchases, and that no one but the
Board of Education itself can prevent such abuses. Such
a check on expenditures is useless, for certainly the one
who asks for and uses the funds would never admit the
expenditures to be unnecessary or extravagant. The Legislature itself could not by appropriation or general statute
provide an effective check. A statutory specification of
the number of employees, the number of typewriters, the
amount of paper, etc., would be impossible to state realistically two years in advance, would not provide the needed
flexibility in administration, and would take up so much
of the time of the Legislature as to be impractical. Yet,
a continuing review by an independent board or official is
necessary to secure efficient and economical administration
of the State Government. In Utah, such a function is vested
in the Board of Examiners and Commission of Finance.
We submit that the plain meaning and purpose of the
present statutes of Utah authorize and require the Commission of Finance to review and, in its discretion or as
agent of the Board of Examiners, to approve or disapprove
expenditures of the State Board of Education.
POINT IV
THE COMMISSION OF FINANCE IS AUTHORIZED AND REQUIRED BY STATUTE TO AP-
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PROVE OR DISAPPROVE ALL APPOINTMENTS OF EMPLOYEES MADE BY THE
STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION, INCLUDING
EXPERTS AND SPECIALLY QUALIFIED PERSONNEL.
Section 63-2-14, Utah Code Annotated 1953, provides
as follows:
"The commission of finance shall examine all
requests for personnel and shall approve or disapprove the same and no new position shall be created
and no vacancy shall be filled until the commission
has certified to the department requesting the creation of a new position or the filling of the vacancy
that the position is necessary to carry on the work
of such department in an efficient and business-like
manner and that the necessary funds therefor are
available to the department. The commission shall
investigate the need for every existing position in
every department and shall report its findings to the
board of examiners with its recommendations for
the most effective means of discontinuing unnecessary positions."
This statute is another part of the state reorganization plan.
Centralized personnel control is vested in the Commission
of Finance in order to pron1ote more efficient utilization
of employees and to prevent the creation and continuance
of unnecessary positions. The discretion vested in the Com·
mission is apparent for it is to "approve or disapprove"·
all requests for personnel and to determine whether a new'
position is "necessary" for the performance of the work
of the department making a request.
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The statute speaks for itself. To avoid repetition we
refer the Court to the cases and arguments in Point III.
We only emphasize that the authority of the Commission
of Finance is effective only as a check on the exercise of
the powers of the various departments of the State. Paraphrasing Industrial Commission v. Price, supra, the Commission of Finance has nothing to say as to who the employees shall be but much to say as to their necessity.
POINT V
THE DUTY OF THE BUDGET OFFICER,
UNDER THE DIRECTION OF THE GOVERNOR, TO APPROVE OR DISAPPROVE WORK
PROGRAMS SUBMITTED BY THE STATE
BOARD OF EDUCATION, IS CONSTITUTIONAL.
By Section 63-2-20, Utah Code Annotated 1953, (Sup:~lemental Record, Par. 18, p. 5) the Budget Officer under
I;he direction of the Governor has power to "revise, alter,
lecrease, or change" the allotments requested in the Board
)f Education's work program. The actual operation of this
~!ystem is described in Supplemental Record, Par. 19, p. 6.
This is an integral part of that part of the state reortranization relative to finances. It requires each depart,nent to estimate its financial needs. It is important to
lli
ealize that not only are appropriations subject to the rea~~
uirement of a work program but all other funds available
efi
:> the particular department are included. Thus, federal
:n~ latching funds, land grant funds, tuitions, fees, or any
ther moneys available to the department must be stated
(1:

1
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and accounted for. The result is that the department knows
what funds it has to work with and can plan accordingly)
the Governor controls and, by controlling, takes the responsibility for policies involving the expenditure of money,
and the public and the Legislature have comprehensive and
accurate figures by which it can be determined what funds
are available and from that information how efficiently our
government is being run.
As to the constitutionality of this procedure, we contend the statute to be an ordinary exercise of the police
power. The Legislature has given the Governor, assisted
by the Budget Director, the duty to supervise the fiscal
policies of the State so that full value is received by the
taxpayers from the taxes they pay to support our government. To this legislation, as well as all other legislation,
the well known presumption of constitutionality applies.
A similar grant of power to the Governor was referred
to in Chez v. Utah State Building Commission, 93 Utah 538J
74 P. 2d 687. There a statute provided:
"The Governor shall haYe authority to reduce or
transfer items or parts thereof within any approJI'
riation, or eliminate any appropriation made herein,
or transfer any appropriation or part thereof to the
general fund."
Although no question was raised as to the discretion thus
vested in the Governor, this Court held it to be proper,
saying, "in the absence of a constitutional provision to the
contrary, the power of the Legislature on the subject of
appropriations is plenary."
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In State ex rel. Boyle v. Ernst, 195 Wash. 214, 78 P.
2d 526, a statute provided that no expenditure for welfare
should be made "except upon allotments approved by the
Governor." A taxpayer, asserting certain welfare expenditures should be made, sought mandamus against the Director of the Washington Welfare Department, whose defense
was that the Governor had failed to approve allotments
for welfare purposes. The taxpayer argued the Governor's
power was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative
power. The court replied :

"* * * of necessity the legislature must delegate to executive and administrative officers the
power to expend state funds. It may and does set
up such safeguards and limitations as it may deem
expedient-as in this instance, where it has prohibited expenditures except upon quarterly budgets
approved by the director, and from allotments made
by the governor. Should the court, in face of these
statutory provisions, grant the writ sought, its decree would amount to nothing short of usurpation
of legislative power and the assumption of executive and administrative functions."
Not only did the Washington Supreme Court refuse to declare the Governor's budgetary control powers unconstitutional but held that to do so would be an unconstitutional
invasion by the judiciary of legislative and executive powers.
The Washington court was correct in holding there was
t. no delegation of legislative power by a statute granting
Jij! budgetary control powers to the Governor.
It is funda~ ~ mental that an appropriation is only a maximum in excess
of which a state department may not spend funds. Approp-
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riations are not directions by the Legislature that the sum
appropriated must be spent. They are only authorizations}
to spend not more than a certain amount-"so much thereof
as may be necessary" is the term used in appropriations.
Explicit in every appropriation is an authorization to the
board or official in charge of the agency to which the appropriation is made to spend less than the entire appropriation if the entire sum is not needed. Except for salaries
and compensation fixed by law, unlimited authority is given
to "revise, alter, decrease or change" proposed expenditures.
Happily, there are some boards and officials who do exercise some restraint in the spending of state money, who
do feel a responsibility to the taxpayers, and who believe
they have no inherent right to spend the money appropriated to them regardless of need. That this is both constitutional and commendable cannot be denied. See Stephen~ v.
Chambers, 34 Cal. App. 660, 168 Pac. 595 at 600; State
Board of Health v. Frohmiller, 42 Ariz. 231, 23 P. 2d 941
(Syl. 3).
Considering this in the light of 63-2-20, which statute
is made a condition to all appropriations (Sees. 1 (b) and
6 (a), Ch. 164, Laws of Utah 1955), it is apparent that the
budgetary control power of the Governor is nothing more
than a legislative authorization to save state money if the
Governor, aided by statistical information and advice from
the Budget Director, deems it necessary. There can be no
objection to placing in the Governor and Budget Director
a power which all department heads would have even with·
out any legislation. True, the Governor and Budget Direc·
tor can supervise the department heads in this respect, but
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this is only a matter of administration of the State Government which the Legislature, in its discretion, has deemed
a wise public policy. If the plan does not work well, it is
up to the Legislature, not the courts, to change it.
There are, of course, other purposes achieved by 632-20. Expenditures are kept within appropriations and other
available funds; the department is advised what funds it
'~an use ; accounting is simplified and clarified ; and finan>ial information is available to the public and the Legislature. We have limited our discussion to the authority of
;he Budget Officer and Governor to revise work programs,
~or respondent has complained only of that.
1

POINT VI
THE STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION IS NOT
A FOURTH BRANCH OF STATE GOVERNMENT.
The court below stated in its opinion (R. 61) :
"The Constitution recognizes four general fields
of Government in and by the State: Legislative,
Executive, .Judicial and Educational."
similar statement was made in the Conclusions of Law
·• nd Judgment (Par. 1, R. 70, 72). It is easy to see that
'uch a concept has far-reaching and drastic effects upon
1e present practice under our Constitution. The court
Jggested some of the changes which would flow from this
mcept. It was reasoned that powers are either granted or
: ~sted, granted powers being those which may be cancelled
revoked, whereas vested powers are those that "cannot
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be cancelled, withdrawn, vacated or annulled by the will 01
by the act of the grantor" (R. 60). It was then noted thai
Article X, Section 8, of the Utah Constitution, relating tc
the Board of Education, vests the general control and sup.
ervision of the public school system in the State Board of
Education. Implicit in this reasoning and the specific ref.
erence to the term "vested" in Article X, Section 8, is the
result that these powers which are vested in the State Board
of Education cannot he withdrawn nor cancelled by the
will of the grantor, to wit, the people of the State of Utah.

'

As applied to the particular issues raised in this case,
it was determined that the control and supervision which
was vested by the Constitution in the State Board of Edu·
cation means that the Board "must have the exclusive
power and right to manage, handle, invest, expend, employ
and supervise all funds and personnel within its jurisdic·
tion." (Par. 3, R. 70, 73.) This we contend to be erroneous
and contrary to both the practice and interpretation of our
State Constitution.
Consider Article X, Section 8, for a moment. It provides, as amended :
"The general control and supervisiOn of the
Public School System shall he vested in a State Board
of Education, the members of which shall be elected
as provided by law."
This merely establishes a State Board of Education to exer-'
cise general control and supervision of the public schook
It is only a declaration of general policy requiring Iegislti
tive implementation to become effective. That this is SDl
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was the holding of State Board of Education v. Commission of Finance, supra. It does not operate to vest constitutional powers in the State Board of Education. It is merely
:descriptive. In Salt Lake City v. Board of Education of
Salt Lake City, 52 Utah 540, 175 Pac. 654, this Court stated:
"Article X of our Constitution, entitled 'Education', provides that the control of the public school
system, which includes all schools of whatever kind
and grade, is vested in the Legislature." (Emphasis
added.)
~Based

upon this, the Court reasoned that local boards of
were subject to legislative control and their pow;~rs and duties were subject to extension or limitation only
.JY the Legislature with the result that city regulations
:~ould not be applied to schools without authorization by the
,Legislature.
,:~ducation

Such an interpretation obviously makes good sense not
j,:mly because it comports with our understanding of the
·epublican form of government but also because it complies
.!xplicitly with Article V, Section 1, of our Constitution.
;:)olicitous as our founding fathers were to the needs and
)rogress of education, they would not have said in one
i\1reath that the "powers of the government of the State of
~Jtah shall be divided into three distinct departments," and
~
n another say that the State Board of Education is a fourth
lepartment of government, exercising broad powers over
:he public school system, which powers cannot be withdrawn
j1tor circumscribed by the people of the State of Utah nor
~'Y its Legislature.
II,

1

w
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A similar contention was made in Montana in State ex
rel. Public Service Commission of Montana, et al. V. Bran.
non, et al., 86 Mont. 200, 283 Pac. 200, 67 A. L. R. 1020.
There a statute required a professor at the University of
Montana to act as state chemist. Article 11, Section 11,
Montana Constitution, provides:
"The general control and supervision of the
state university and the various other state educational institutions shall be vested in a state board of
education, whose powers and duties shall be prescribed * * * by law. * * *"

It was contended that this provision of the state constitution prevented the Legislature from imposing a non-educational duty on a university professor. In holding to the
contrary, the court stated:
"The assertion that the Legislature is without
power to prescribe or regulate the functions of the
University or one of its units cannot be admitted.
That the board of education is 'within the scope of
its functions, co-ordinate and equal with the legislature' must be denied. 'The powers of the govern·
ment of this state are divided into three distinct
departments : The Legislative, executive, and judi·
cial, and no person or collection of persons charged
with the exercise of powers properly belonging w
one of these departments shall exercise any powers
properly belonging to either of the others, except
as in this constitution expressly directed or per·
mitted.' Section 1, art. 4, Constitution.
. "The board of education is a part of the execu·
tlve department, and is but an agency of the stau
government. The Legislature may prescribe the
extent of the powers and duties to be exercised by
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the board in the general control and supervision of
the University of Montana. The Legislature may
broaden the functions of the University, or any of
its units. It may require research and experimental
work to a greater extent than is now being carried
on, and for the public benefit may require the discharge of functions in new fields. In other words,
the state may extend, and add power to, its developmental arm."

(i

Thus, Article X, Section 8, does not of itself vest constitutional powers in the Board of Education. It follows
that the Powers of the Board of Examiners, Commission
of Finance and Governor are in no way in conflict with
Article X, Section 8.

Even considering general control and supervision of
the schools to be a self-executing grant of power, it must
nevertheless be held that claims made by the Board of
~E Education must be approved by the Board of Examiners
~ and the Commission of Finance as agent of the Board of
1i Examiners. The responsibilities of the Board of Exam~; iners only relate to the wise use of funds by state agencies
:itt including the Board of Education. Certainly, the Board
~ of Education would be the last to admit that it is wholly
m concerned with spending money and does not have additional important policy making and supervisory functions
~ which do not involve expenditures. It is only the money
11:
~ spending powers of the Board of Education that the Board
of Examiners supervises, and as to this, the Examiners
tt are not only justified but required by the Constitution to
:~continue such supervision. This does not qualify the pow!tf- ers of the Board of Education. Within its powers it has
G

!l~
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the initiative to do what it will. Only when it makes an
unwise or illegal expenditure does the Board of Examiners
act to restrain them. The extravagant or unlawful exercisJ
of the spending powers of the Board of Education are restrained, not the existence or extent of the powers granted.
As was stated by the Idaho court in State ex rel. Taylor v.
Robinson, supra, "the people of the State through the Constitution have placed the State Board of Examiners as the
final arbiters of expenditures" and further "the Constitution sets up what were considered by its framers as essential
safeguards as to the expenditure of public funds generally,1,
These same essential safeguards on expenditures are a part
of the Utah Constitution and cannot be impaired by the
Judiciary, the Legislature, or even by the Board of Educai
tion. Only the people, by constitutional amendment, can
alter this principle of our State Government.
POINT VII
IN DISPUTES BETWEEN STATE DEPARTMENTS, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL HAS
DISCRETION TO REFUSE TO APPOINT
COUNSEL.
It was conceded below that the Attorney General, as
legal adviser of all state officers (Article VE, Sec. 18,
Utah Constitution) and being in charge "of all civil legal
matters in which the State is in anywise interested" (67·
5-1 (1), U. C. A. 1953), is the legal adviser of the State
Board of Education, its officers and employees and that, as
a general rule, the Board of Education has no authority to

1
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employ its own counsel. See Annotation, 137 A. L. R. 818.
It was contended, however, and the court below so held that
when a dispute arises between the Board of Education
and other departments or agencies, counsel may be employed without the consent of the Attorney General.
The problem is not easy of solution and we wish to
assure the Court that what we say here is not aimed at the
able attorneys for respondent.
We realize that the Attorney General is in no different position than any other attorney in being unable to
represent both sides of a controversy. Nor can the matter
be solved by having different attorneys in the Attorney
General's office represent each side, a fact Justice Larson
noted in his concurring opinion in Chez v. Utah State Building Commission, supra. See also State v. Hendrix (Ariz.
1942), 124 P. 2d 769.
Thus, there is a dilemma. On the one hand, there is
the policy of having a single legal adviser for all state departments. One of the purposes of such a policy is, we
believe, to avoid duplication of effort and expense. Furthermore, as applied to disputes between departments, it has
the effect of providing an arbitrator, for most of such
disputes are settled by an opinion rendered by the Attorney
General. On the other hand is the policy of our adversary
system of jurisprudence which has shown that the best
presentation of both sides of a dispute occurs when each
is represented independently.
In such a dilemma, we believe the Attorney General
has authority to employ special assistant attorneys general
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for the side he chooses not to represent. See Reiter v.
Wallgren (Wash.), 184 P. 2d 571. This should be done in
every case where the Attorney General, on his own behalf
or as attorney for another state department, is suing a
state department or official for violations of the Constitution or statutes (criminal violations, of course, excepted).
This is so even though he has the statutory duty to defend
all state departments and officers (See 67-5-1 (1)) for as
noted in Sta.te ex rel. Dunbar, Attorney General v. State
Board of Equalization, 140 Wash. 433, 249 Pac. 996:
"His [the Attorney General's] paramount duty
is made the protection of the interests of the people
of the state, and, where he is cognizant of violations
of the constitution or the statutes by a state officer,
his duty is to obstruct, and not to assist, and, where
the interests of the public are antagonistic to those
of state officers, or where state officers may conflict
among themselves, it is impossible and improper for
the attorney general to defend such state officers."
But where one department has a grievan°e agajnst
another and the Attorney General, as a lawyer, feels such
a claim to be unsubstantial, a different rule must be applied.
In such a case, we contend, the Attorney General can refuse
to appoint special counsel. This has the effect, it is true,
of denying the department the right to prosecute its claim.
Yet in such a case, is not the duty of the Attorney General
to provide legal representation to all departments subordinate to his primary duty to protect the interests of the
people of the State? One of the beneficial results of a single
legal adviser is the prevention of groundless litigation and
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the avoidance of unnecessary expenditures of public funds
for legal expense.
This is not to say that the Attorney General should
or would refuse to appoint counsel where he disagrees with
the claims of the prospective plaintiff. He must exercise his
discretion as a lawyer even though personally he believes the
claim unsound or officially he has taken a contrary position.
If a substantial question exists, counsel should be appointed;
if not, counsel should be denied. Bear in mind, the decision
to proceed with litigation is a decision which the departments themselves are not qualified to make.
We submit that the Attorney General, as legal adviser
of all state officers and having charge as attorney "of all
civil legal matters in which the State is in anywise interested," is the only official under our Constitution and statutes to make such a decision.

CONCLUSION
The fundamental issue underlying this case is whether
the present structure of State Government in Utah provides
for a system of checks and balances on the expenditure of
public funds. We contend such a system exists and applies
to the State Board of Education along with all other departments and agencies of the State. We contend that the
people of the State of Utah who adopted our Constitution
established such a system through the Board of Examiners
and that the people, through their representatives in the
Legislature, expanded and amplified this system through
the 1941 reorganization plan. Our state educational agen-
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cies, important as they are in carrying out so vital and
fundamental a state service as education, are but one aspect
of the total functions of the State. They are not so important as to be a government unto themselves, unrestricted
and unsupervised by any other state department or agency
and not subject to control by even the Legislature. This,
we submit, is not and cannot be the law in Utah.
The judgment of the court below should be reversed.
Respectfully submitted,
E. R. CALLISTER,
Attorney General,
H. R. WALDO, JR.,
Special Assistant
Attorney General,

Attorneys for Appellants.
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